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1.  Introduction 
 
Capital markets researchers frequently use regressions of contemporaneous 
stock returns on accounting variables to evaluate whether or how effectively 
accounting information captures events that have affected the firm over the fiscal 
period.  Accounting’s ability to capture these events is measured against stock price 
(or change in stock price) which presumably reflects the same events completely and 
unbiasedly, i.e. is “efficient.”    Many of the studies using returns/earnings regressions 
draw inferences by testing the magnitude of regression coefficients (earnings 
response coefficients or ERCs) or differences in ERCs.  However, the coefficients can 
be affected by factors not central to the research question such as market inefficiency.   
Prior research gives little recognition to the bias in coefficients resulting when the 
dependent variable - stock price - reacts to information with a delay.  
The assumption of market efficiency is contradicted by a growing body of 
evidence that the market is not completely efficient with respect to publicly available 
accounting information.1 In particular, associations exist between accounting 
information and future returns suggesting some of the impact of information captured 
by current period accounting variables is reflected in future rather than 
contemporaneous stock returns.    For example, Penman and Zhang (PZ) (2002) 
observe a positive association between their measure of accounting conservatism and 
future excess returns, suggesting the market is misled by conservative accounting.   
                                                 
1Kothari’s 2001 comprehensive survey of capital market research includes a review of accounting 
studies investigating market inefficiency.  
 
 




An interesting question not addressed by PZ then arises: Would results of studies on 
conservatism that focus on tests of ERCs and assume market efficiency actually 
reflect conservatism or market inefficiency?  The answer gains importance in light of 
conservatism’s pervasive influence on accounting and the amount of attention it has 
attracted from accounting researchers in recent years. 
In this study, I adapt a procedure developed by Aboody, Hughes and Liu (AHL) 
(2002) to adjust coefficients for bias caused by inefficiencies induced by accounting 
conservatism. The AHL adjustment reduces bias in the estimation of coefficients in a 
value relevance regression when inefficient stock prices measure intrinsic value with 
error. Exploiting the notion that market inefficiencies are resolved over time, AHL 
adjust the dependent variable (price or returns) for future price changes that include 
delayed market reactions to current accounting information.  As a result, the adjusted 
regressions in AHL produce coefficient estimates that capture contemporaneous and 
delayed market reactions to accounting variables. AHL do not attempt to identify 
specific aspects of accounting that contribute to the inefficiency-induced bias, but 
their procedure provides a means to test the influence of conservatism on market 
efficiency and allows an examination of the consequent implications for coefficients 
in value relevance regressions.   
In tests of return predictability, I find strong associations between market 
inefficiency and three measures of conservatism: two capture conservatism’s 
temporary effects on earnings quality and the third captures conservatism’s effect on 
the asymmetric timeliness of earnings.  Results from the AHL adjusted regressions 




are less significant but give some support to the notion that failure to control for the 
joint effects of conservatism and market efficiency may bias ERCs enough to affect 
economic inferences.  I find significant differences between the magnitude of average 
ERC adjustments for market inefficiencies between samples exhibiting high and 
medium levels of conservatism as measured by Penman and Zhang’s Q-score.  I also 
find significant differences between the ERC adjustments for samples exhibiting high 
and low conservatism, but the sign of the difference is opposite of predictions based 
on the patterns of returns observed in PZ.   They claim, but do not directly test, that 
the market inefficiency suggested by the results in their study is due to the market 
responding inappropriately to current earnings because of an inability to penetrate the 
implications of conservatism for earnings quality.  While intuitive, their claim is not 
supported when subjected to closer scrutiny.   My results suggest the abnormal future 
returns to a trading strategy based on the Q-score demonstrated by PZ are not 
associated with current earnings.  
    The rest of the paper is organized as follows.  The next section provides 
background and contains a review of related literature.  Section 3 outlines my 
research design and describes the empirical proxies and sample I use in the study.   









2.   Background and Literature Review 
 
2.1 Conservatism 
 Conservatism serves as a constraint on the measurement and recognition 
criteria in GAAP.  Application of conservatism leads to a tendency toward early 
recognition of unfavorable events and the minimization of net assets and income, and 
this introduces a bias into financial reporting (FASB 1984).   Conservative policies 
include the immediate expensing of costs whose future economic benefit cannot be 
measured with sufficient reliability (e.g. advertising and R&D), recording 
depreciation in excess of economic depreciation, LIFO accounting for inventories in 
periods of rising prices, and higher verifiability requirements for the  recognition of 
good news relative to bad news. 
  Staubus (1985) views conservatism as a major component of approximately 
one-third of accounting standards.  Sterling (1970) deems conservatism the most 
influential valuation principle in accounting.    Numerous recent studies confirm 
accounting is conservative and has become more conservative over time (Givoly and 
Hayn 2000, Basu 1997, and others).  Despite conservatism’s prominence in 
accounting standards, a “generally accepted definition of conservatism” does not exist 
(Givoly and Hayn 2000, p. 291).  Thus, researchers examine the effects of 
conservatism from different points of view.  For instance, a set of studies views 




conservatism as conditional, or news dependent;  the lower of cost or market method 
of valuing inventory and impairment rules for long-lived assets are examples of 
conditional conservatism.  Basu (1997) was the first to empirically examine 
accounting conservatism from this perspective. He posits that the lag in accounting 
recognition is less pronounced for the recognition of “bad news” relative to “good 
news” due to conservatism’s higher verifiability requirements for the recording of 
gains.  To test his prediction, Basu (1997) uses negative (positive) returns to proxy for 
bad (good) news in a regression in which earnings is the dependent variable.  He finds 
earnings are more sensitive to bad news, suggesting that the timeliness of earnings 
varies with the type of news.    
 Conservatism can also be unconditional, or news independent, meaning that 
the accounting rules yield unrecorded goodwill at the inception of an economic event 
(Beaver and Ryan 2004).2    For instance, the immediate expensing of costs with 
future benefits remaining at year end (e.g. R&D and advertising) is conservatism in 
the unconditional sense.   Feltham and Ohlson (1995) characterize this type of 
conservatism as “biased accounting,” meaning that reported net assets are expected to 
be less than market value in the long run.   A large literature, beginning with 
                                                 
2 “Conditional” and “unconditional” conservatism are relatively recent terminology used to distinguish 
the two types of conservatism (see Beaver and Ryan 2004).  Prior studies such as Basu (1997) and 
others refer to “conservatism in the income statement” and “conservatism in the balance sheet.”  
Beaver and Ryan note that all conservatism affects the balance sheet and income statement consistently 
if clean surplus holds and if transactions in firm’s equity are accounted for at fair value.   The 
literatures on conditional and unconditional conservatism are generally separate; however Beaver and 
Ryan (2004) develop a model that captures the interactions between the two types.  For example they 
state, “…unconditional conservatism yields unrecorded goodwill that preempts the application of 
conditional conservatism unless news is sufficiently bad to use up that goodwill (p. 46).” 
 




Greenball (1969), models and empirically investigates the implications of 
unconditional conservatism on accounting numbers in the presence of growth (see 
also Penman and Zhang 2002).   
  
2.2  Accounting and Market Inefficiency  
Overall, evidence from a significant body of research suggests the market 
reacts quickly to accounting information.  However, a growing body of evidence 
points to instances where the market reaction to accounting data is incomplete or 
biased. One notable example is the market’s delayed reaction to earnings, i.e. the 
post-earnings announcement drift, first observed in Ball and Brown (1968).  
Numerous subsequent studies examine possible explanations for the drift including 
Bernard and Thomas (1989, 1990).  Bernard and Thomas rule out risk-based and 
transaction-cost based explanations for the drift and conclude investors appear to 
underestimate the implications of current earnings for future earnings (i.e ignore the 
serial correlation in quarterly earnings).  Ou and Penman (1989) use multiple 
financial ratios that incorporate information other than earnings from the current 
period financial statements to predict earnings changes; they provide evidence that 
the predicted earnings changes can also predict returns.  Results in Sloan (1996) 
suggest that although cash flows are more persistent than accruals, the market acts as 
if they have the same persistence implying the market under-reacts to cash flows 
relative to accruals (the “accrual anomaly”).  Thus, a trading strategy of going long in 
high cash flow firms and short in high accrual firms earns abnormal profits.   Frankel 




and Lee (1998)’s residual income intrinsic value measure constructed from analyst’s 
forecasts also demonstrates predictive ability for future abnormal returns. 
 AHL (2002) appear to be the first to develop a formal analysis of the impact 
of market inefficiency on coefficients in value relevance studies and derive an 
econometric solution to correct bias that results from delayed market reactions to 
accounting variables.  AHL posit that when the market measures stock price with 
error, any correlation between the error and the accounting variables of interest biases 
the coefficient due to the omitted correlated variable problem. AHL mitigate the bias 
by adjusting current prices to include risk-adjusted future price changes so that the 
dependent variable encompasses future as well as current price effects of information 
about intrinsic value contained in the current accounting variables.  AHL apply the 
adjustment to three types of value relevance regressions found in the literature:   
•  the value relevance of earnings and book values (both price level and 
return regressions) 
•  the value relevance of residual income value estimates and  
•  the value relevance of accruals and cash flows.   
AHL find mean and median coefficient estimates in the adjusted return regressions 
are significantly larger in magnitude than those obtained from the non-adjusted 
regressions.3  For example, the coefficients on earnings and book value increase by 
                                                 
3AHL do not predict overreaction or underreaction by the market and thus cannot predict the direction 
of the correction.   An exception is the regression on residual income value estimates.  To support their 
argument that the adjustment procedure reduces error in value relevance estimations, AHL regress 
stock returns on a residual income-based intrinsic value deflated by lagged price where the predicted 
coefficient is one.   AHL’s finding that the coefficient moves toward the predicted coefficient suggests 
the procedure is effective in removing bias in estimates induced by market inefficiencies.  AHL obtain 




90% and 82%, respectively, when stock price is adjusted for three-year-ahead returns.  
For regressions with residual income as the independent variable, the adjustment 
results in a 24% mean increase in regression coefficients toward the predicted value 
of one.  After adjustment, the coefficient on cash flows is significantly higher than the 
coefficient on accruals consistent with their differential persistence.  Overall, 
evidence in AHL suggests their procedure considerably reduces bias in coefficients in 
return regressions and also emphasizes the importance of considering market 
inefficiency effects when drawing inferences from coefficients in value relevance 
studies.  
 
2.3  Conservatism and Market Inefficiency 
Relatively few studies examine the relation between conservatism and market 
inefficiency.  The predominant type of study in this area is related to one aspect of 
unconditional conservatism, accounting for R&D expenditures.  While the results of 
many studies suggest the market capitalizes R&D expenditures although the 
accounting does not (e.g. Lev and Sougiannis 1996, Hirschey and Weygandt 1985, 
and Deng and Lev 1998), other studies suggest investors are misled by conservative 
accounting for R&D.   Lev and Sougiannis (1996) and Chan et al. (2001) report a 
positive association between the level of R&D investment and subsequent excess 
returns.  However, Chambers et al. (2002) suggest the association is more likely due 
                                                                                                                                           
more modest adjustments (but significant) for the level regressions.  They argue that since price 
contains information accumulated since the inception of the firm and market inefficiencies more likely 
relate to new information, the bias is mitigated.  
 




to inadequately controlling for risk rather than a mispricing explanation.  Similar to 
Lev et al. (2000) and Penman and Zhang (2002), Chambers et al. (2002) report a 
positive association between changes in R&D investment and subsequent excess 
returns that does not appear to be explained by failure to adjust for risk.  Overall, the 
evidence suggests the market is inefficient with respect to information about R&D, 
and the inefficiency arises when R&D investment experiences a material change. 
The finding that changes in (rather than levels of) R&D investment are 
associated with mispricings is not surprising given the fact that unconditionally 
conservative accounting methods affect earnings only when the level of investment in 
assets changes over time.  As PZ explain, the potential for investors to be misled by 
conservative accounting methods arises if a temporary change in investment results in 
a temporary earnings change making current earnings a poor predictor of future 
earnings.   Penman and Zhang illustrate the interaction between conservatism and 
growth using accounting for R&D as an example.    In the absence of growth in 
investment, the immediate expensing of R&D expenditures has no affect on earnings 
relative to capitalizing the R&D asset and amortizing it over its economic life.  
However, the immediate expensing of R&D costs lowers earnings and creates 
“reserves” if investment in R&D increases.4  In contrast, slowing R&D investment 
reduces reserves and increases earnings as “the benefits from past expenditures are 
recognized without matching additional new expenditures” (Penman and Zhang 2002, 
                                                 
4The term “reserve” has many connotations in accounting (an appropriation of retained earnings, for 
example) and accounting literature (e.g. “cookie jar” reserves).  In this paper, reserve refers to the 
unrecorded asset resulting from the expensing of costs that have remaining future economic benefit as 
of the balance sheet date. 




p. 241).  Any accounting method that recognizes higher expenses (or lower revenues) 
in the early years of a transaction relative to an unbiased method lowers net assets and 
has a similar effect.  Accelerated depreciation methods have no effect on earnings if 
depreciable assets are not growing, but decrease earnings through the creation of 
reserves if the investment in assets increases.  If investments in depreciable assets 
decrease, earnings increase through the liquidation of the “hidden” reserves.  Thus, 
conservative accounting methods combined with changes in investment may lead to 
mispricing if investors misjudge the sustainability of earnings when the change in 
investment is temporary.   
 PZ construct a measure that captures the combined effect of conservatism and 
growth in investment to test the market’s ability to understand the implications of 
conservatism for earnings quality.  PZ characterize earnings as high quality if current 
earnings are useful in predicting future earnings.  The “Q-score” includes estimated 
reserves (ER), or unrecorded assets, that result from accounting for R&D, inventory, 
and advertising deflated by net operating assets (NOA): 













Q    
If a firm builds up its reserve at a rate faster (slower) than the growth in net 
operating assets, Q is positive (negative).  Both “high” (positive) and “low” 
(negative) Q-scores are indicators of poor earnings quality.     




Consistent with an association between market inefficiency and Q, PZ observe 
differential returns for portfolios formed on Q.   For two years prior to and including 
year 0, the year of portfolio formation, returns to low-Q portfolios are higher that 
returns to high-Q portfolios.  This is consistent with the releasing of reserves that 
temporarily increases earnings for low-Q firms and the building up of reserves that 
temporarily decreases earnings for high-Q firms.   However, for years +1 to +5, the 
pattern reverses, suggesting the market misinterprets information in firms’ earnings in 
years -2 to 0 but corrects this mistake in subsequent years.   The ability to earn excess 
future returns on a trading strategy based on Q suggests an association between 
accounting conservatism and the market’s inability to process conservatism’s 
implications for earnings quality.   In an efficient market, investors will “see through” 
the accounting when using financial information in assessing future prospects of the 
firm.  However, PZ’s results are consistent with investors failing to differentiate 
accounting effects from real economic news. 
In the current study, I investigate whether the conservatism-induced 
inefficiencies documented by PZ affect conclusions from regressions of returns on 
earnings.  While I replicate PZ’s tests as a first step in my analyses, my study differs 
from PZ’s in two respects.  First, the procedure developed by AHL (2002) allows me 
to consider the effect of market inefficiency related to conservatism on ERCs.  
Second, I consider alternate measures of conservatism in my tests.    
 




3.  Research Design 
 
3.1  Measuring Market Inefficiency 
 Accounting researchers frequently assess the association between current-
period accounting variables and future returns to investigate market efficiency.  
Kothari (2001) and others refer to these as “return predictability” tests.  One common 
test analyzes future abnormal returns on stock portfolios formed on a current-period 
variable of interest.  Penman and Zhang (2002) apply this approach to investigate the 
market’s ability to penetrate information in conservative earnings.  For completeness, 
I replicate their test using their Q-score and also with alternate measures of 
conservatism.  However, my primary analysis is based on the method developed by 
Aboody, Hughes and Liu (2002), described below. While future abnormal returns to a 
trading strategy can provide evidence of market inefficiencies, the results do not 
provide direct evidence regarding the effect of inefficiencies on the coefficients in 
contemporaneous value relevance regressions.    
AHL (2002) analytically show how coefficients in value relevance regressions 
can be estimated free of bias induced by market inefficiencies by changing the 
dependent variable to include future returns deflated by expected returns attributable 
to compensation for risk.  In essence, the adjustment extracts information about the 
current measurement error in returns from future returns and incorporates it into 
current returns.  By adjusting returns for future risk adjusted price changes, the 




regressions in AHL produce coefficients that capture contemporaneous as well as 
delayed market reactions to current earnings and book value.  
AHL assume value relevance is measured by coefficients in the following 
linear relationship: 
 ( ) ittitit XBXVE ′=|      (1) 
where Vit and the vector Xit denote intrinsic value and accounting variables for firm i 
at time t, respectively 
AHL further assume stock price, Pit, at time t measures intrinsic value, 
Vit,with error, uit, i.e. in an inefficient market E(uit | Iit ) ≠ 0 where  Iit  is all 
information available for firm i at time t: 
 ititit uVP +=       (2) 
If time t inefficiencies are resolved by the end of the period t+ 1 then 
 
E(uit+ 1 | Iit ) = 0   (3) 
AHL also assume intrinsic value Vit fully reflects all information so that expected 
return on Vit is driven purely by risk: 
 ( ) ( )11111 |,| +++++ == titttitit FREIFRER υυυ   (4) 




VDV −+ ++ 11 , and 1+tF  
is the realization of time t+1 risk factors.  The expectation of time t + 1 cum-dividend 
stock price conditional on Xit, Pit, Vit, and Ft+1  can be written as: 
      ( )ititittitit VPXFDPE ,,,| 111 +++ +  




      = ( )ititittititit VPXFuDVE ,,,| 1111 ++++ ++  substituting (2) 
      = ( )ititittitit VPXFDVE ,,,| 111 +++ +  using (3) 
      = ( ) itit VR υ 11 ++       (5) 
Thus, intrinsic value at time t, Vit , equals the expected cum-dividend stock pricet+1 



















υ    (6) 
Taking the expectation of (6) conditional only on Xit and applying the law of iterated 
expectations: 



















υ    (7) 
Since ( ) ( ) itititit PRDPE 111 1 +++ +=+ , the adjusted contemporaneous price that measures 



















1 .   AHL show the one-period model extends to 
multi-periods in which the measurement errors are assumed to follow a time-series 
process.  AHL also demonstrate the adjustment does not create unwanted bias if 
markets are indeed efficient. 
   My analysis starts by replicating the non-adjusted and adjusted cross-
sectional annual regressions in AHL:    
itεββ ++=  /PNI   R 1-itit10it    and 
itεββ ˆ   /PNIˆ ˆ  R̂ 1-itit10it ++=  
























1ˆ , and Rit+τ (τ = 1, 2, 3) is firm i’s stock return for 36 months 
beginning three months after the fiscal year end t, and υ τ+itR  (τ =1, 2, 3) is the  
corresponding size-decile return to control for price changes related to risk.5   
Percentage changes in regression coefficients from unadjusted regressions to adjusted 




ββ −ˆ .6  Each year’s percentage change is then treated 
as a separate observation in statistical tests of significance.   
 To assess whether conservatism causes  bias in coefficients, I repeat the 
above analysis separately on samples exhibiting high and low levels of the 
conservatism measures (described below) and substitute operating income for net 
income.   Operating income excludes temporary components of income which are 
less affected by conservatism in both the conditional and unconditional sense as 
measured in my study.  The statistical tests assess the statistical significance of 
differences in the two samples’ mean and median annual cross-sectional percentage 
changes.   If the percentage changes for high- and low-Q samples, then conservatism 
is associated with the market inefficiency bias in the slope coefficients.  In the next 
section, I discuss measures that allow comparison of relative levels of conservatism. 
                                                 
5Like AHL, I set τ equal to 1, 2, or 3 years.  AHL arbitrarily limit τ to 3 years and observe the largest 
difference when τ = 3 which suggests the market takes up to three years to reverse some inefficiencies.  
Finding significantly different coefficients for longer periods may imply AHL’s adjustment 
inadequately controls for risk.  Unlike AHL, I do not include book value as an independent variable 
because my primary focus is on the coefficient on earnings.  
6 AHL define the percentage change in regression coefficients as the unadjusted coefficient minus the 
adjusted coefficient divided by the unadjusted coefficient.  Thus, an increase in coefficients in their 
paper leads to a negative percentage change.  To simplify the interpretation of results, I subtract the 
unadjusted coefficient from the adjusted so that an increase in coefficients leads to a positive 
percentage change. 




3.2  Identifying the Earnings Impact of Conservatism  
 In addition to PZ’s Q-score, I adapt proxies developed in prior studies to 
measure the relative influence of conservative accounting on firms’ accounting 
numbers.  I am limited to measures constructed from accounting data; the use of 
market data implicitly assumes the market prices information in an unbiased manner, 
and such an assumption contradicts the premise of my paper.  A description of each 
measure follows. 
PZ (2002) develop two indices to analyze the quality of earnings.  The first is 
a C-score.  It equals the sum of estimated reserves derived from inventory, R&D, and 
advertising, and measures the effect of conservative accounting on the balance sheet.  
The following unrecorded assets are summed and scaled by net operating assets to 
form Cit: 
 
• Unrecorded Inventory Asset equals the LIFO reserve reported in the 
footnotes. 
 
• Unrecorded Research and Development Asset is the estimated R&D asset, net 
of amortization, that would appear on the balance sheet if outlays for R&D 
were not immediately expensed.  Lev and Sougiannis’ (1996) industry 
amortization rates and estimated useful lives can be used to estimate the 










where t is the current period, R&Dt-k is the R&D expenditure for the kth lag, δ 
is the unamortized percentage of the kth lag’s R&D expenditure, and T is the 
useful life of R&D investments.7 
                                                 
7 Requiring the past k lags of R&D to be nonmissing potentially results in a significant loss of 
observations. So I adopt a procedure from Mason (2004) where past R&D expenditures can be 
estimated from current period R&D expenditures and estimated industry growth using the following : 





• Unrecorded Advertising Asset is advertising expenditures assumed to be 
capitalized and amortized over a two year useful life, using the sum-of-the-
year’s digits method of depreciation.8  
 
To measure conservatism’s income statement effects, PZ subtracts Cit-1 from 
Cit   to form a Q-score.9  By measuring the change in estimated reserves relative to net 
operating assets, the Q-score has the ability to capture conservatism’s temporary 
effects on current earnings due to the interaction of conservatism and changes in 
investment.  For instance, if estimated reserves grow faster (slower) than net 
operating assets, then Q is positive (negative); either a high (i.e. positive) or a low 
(i.e. negative) Q-score implies poor earnings quality.  If estimated reserves grow at 
the same rate as net operating assets, then conservatism has no effect on earnings and 
the resulting Q-score of zero indicates high earnings quality.   
I use PZ’s Q-score and the AHL regressions to investigate whether 
conservatism leads to bias in ERCs.  If inefficiencies related to conservatism are 
significant enough to affect inferences from returns-earnings regressions, then I 
should detect significant differences in unadjusted and adjusted coefficients across 
                                                                                                                                           
 














where lag i,n is the estimated expenditure for firm i for the nth prior period.  The subscript t denotes the 
current period and j represents firm i’s two-digit SIC code.  
8 Evidence from Bublitz and Etteredge (1989) suggests advertising has a short useful life, typically 
from one to two years.  Penman and Zhang assume a two-year life when estimating the advertising 
reserve. 
9 PZ equally weight two measures of “unexpected” Cit to form Q: the change in Cit, and Cit minus a 
median industry Cit.  Because PZ arbitrarily select an equal weighting scheme and find no significant 
difference in results when using Q-scores calculated by alternating weights of 1 and 0 on each measure 
of the unexpected C, I calculate Q as the change in C.   




samples formed on Q.  Unfortunately, predicting the direction and magnitude of 
percentage changes in ERCs for the high, medium, and low Q samples is problematic 
since Q does not ordinally rank firms on conservatism’s earnings effects.  Recall that 
PZ observe higher year 0 returns for the lowest Q-deciles (relative to the higher 
deciles); they attribute this to the market interpreting the temporary boost in earnings 
caused by conservatism as permanent.  PZ observe a decrease in returns in future 
years as the market resolves the inefficiencies.   They find the opposite result for the 
highest-Q deciles:  low returns in year 0 reverse in future years. Therefore, I expect 
low-Q firms to have lower adjusted ERCs compared to the unadjusted ERCs, and the 
high-Q firms should have higher adjusted average ERCs.  However, AHL find 
positive increases for average coefficients when adjusting returns for one, two or 
three year forward returns.  Since I do not know the level of Q for firms in their 
sample, the implications of their results for my predictions are unclear. Either high-Q 
firms dominate their sample or all firms experience increases in adjusted ERCs due to 
some factor unrelated to Q.  For instance, a Q-score of zero implies conservatism has 
no effect on earnings because relative amounts of reserves to net operating assets are 
not changing.  Accordingly, PZ find relatively flat returns for years -2 to +5 for 
medium-Q firms in their return predictability tests suggesting the market efficiently 
processes information in high quality earnings.  Thus, I expect no percentage change 
for coefficients from regressions using the sample consisting of the middle decile-
rankings of Q (where Q is approximately zero).  However, AHL find significant 
increases in coefficients for their regressions that do not consider conservatism 




suggesting I may find a positive adjustment for medium-Q firms.  In light of AHL’s 
results and my inability to control for factors other than Q, I make no predictions 
regarding the sign of the average percentage change in ERCs for medium and low 
deciles.  Rather, I expect a greater increase in coefficients for the high-Q sample 
relative to the medium-Q sample and a greater increase in the medium-Q sample 
relative to the low-Q sample.  
 
3.3  Alternative Measures of Conservatism 
Similar to PZ’s Q-score (2002), Mason (2004) estimates unrecorded assets 
relative to net operating assets to form an accounting-based measure of bias in a 
firm’s balance sheet, a conservatism “score.”  In addition to R&D, advertising, and 
inventory, the estimated unrecorded assets in Mason’s score include these related to 
accounts receivable, depreciation, and pension assets.  The unrecorded Accounts 
Receivable Asset is measured as the difference between the firm’s actual allowance 
for uncollectible accounts and a firm-specific minimum allowance.  The minimum 
allowance is calculated by multiplying the firm’s gross receivables by an industry-
based minimum percentage, the lowest ratio of the allowance to gross receivables 
within an industry.  The minimum percentage is adjusted for days’ sales in 
receivables to remove expected losses from liberal accounting policies from the 
unrecorded asset.  Unrecorded Property, Plant, and Equipment is measured as a firm’s 
accumulated depreciation in excess of the accumulated depreciation assuming an 
industry-based maximum asset life.  While her score excludes some unrecorded assets 




for tractability (e.g. goodwill) as do PZ (2002), it is broader in scope than PZ’s Q-
score by including unrecorded assets resulting from conservatism arising from 
management’s estimates.10  Mason uses levels of her score to rank firms on the level 
of conservatism affecting the balance sheet for her study, but I calculate the change in 
her score to enable the measure to capture conservatism’s interaction with change in 
investment (as in PZ).  Mason also includes unrecognized gains and losses resulting 
from pension plan assets in her estimate of unrecorded assets.  A preliminary review 
of the data reveals this data item is missing for a large number of firms; therefore I do 
not include it in my modified version of her score.  
A measure of conservatism motivated by Givoly and Hayn (2000) is the sign 
and magnitude of accumulated accruals over time.  Since accruals are the mechanism 
that enables the immediate recognition of unfavorable events and a gradual 
recognition of favorable events, Givoly and Hayn’s measure captures conservatism in 
the conditional sense (as in Basu 1997), without relying on stock price movements as 
a signal for news.   Without conservatism, both positive and negative accruals reverse 
over time and average net accumulated accruals should approach zero.  For a sample 
of firms with conservatism, average accruals should be negative.  Following the 
intuition in Givoly and Hayn (2000), Ahmed et al. (2002) construct an accrual-based 
measure to capture conservatism’s income statement effects – net accruals excluding 
depreciation (net income before extraordinary items plus depreciation expense less 
operating cash flows) deflated by assets and averaged over five-year periods.  After 
                                                 
10 Penman and Zhang (2002) exclude unrecorded assets arising from discretion in management 
estimates (for example, conservatism in estimates of the allowance of uncollectible accounts 
receivable) to focus on earnings quality issues related to permanent accounting policy.    




multiplying the measure by -1, the measure is increasing in negative accruals and 
conservatism.  Because the accumulation of accruals is also affected by growth of 
sample firms, splitting the sample on the accrual-based measure in my analysis results 
in an examination of the combined effect of investment growth and conservatism on 
market efficiency.  
Figure 1 provides an overview of the study’s five analyses. The first set of 
analyses serve as a benchmark; for those I implement a trading strategy approach for 
each of the three conservatism measures similar to that implemented by Penman and 
Zhang (2002).  However, my main focus (and innovation of the study) is the second 
set of analyses which uses the method in AHL to examine differences in estimated 
coefficients between firms exhibiting differing levels of conservatism.   
 
3.4  Sample and Data 
 Because the different conservatism measures impose different restrictions on 
the data, I construct three separate samples.  Firms must have sufficient data from the 
annual COMPUSTAT files to construct the conservatism measures.  Monthly stock 
returns, end-of-year size-decile assignments, and decile returns are supplied by 
CRSP. The sample period begins in 1975 because accounting data necessary to 
construct the conservatism scores were missing for a significant number of firms prior 
to that year.  However, for analyses using the Q-score and the modified version of 
Mason’s score, the earliest year is 1976 because of the differencing required to 
determine both measures.  The sample period ends in 2003, the last year of available 




data.11   Sample sizes vary depending on the annual return period being analyzed for 
the returns predictability tests (i.e. years -2 to +5 relative to the year of portfolio 
formation year 0).  For the AHL regressions, sample sizes vary with the return 
adjustment horizon (i.e. one-, two-, or three-years ahead).  Items designated as having 
insignificant values by Compustat are set to zero.  Following PZ, if one or two of the 
three score components (R&D, LIFO reserve, or advertising) are nonmissing, the 
industry median (2-digit SIC code) substitutes for the missing item(s).  I apply the 
same procedure for Mason’s score (five components) to conserve data points.  
Because some firms within SIC codes 6000-6999 (insurance, real estate and 
investment brokers) capitalize a portion of software development costs that are 
included in Compustat’s variable for R&D expenditures (data item 46), these firm-
years are eliminated.  I also eliminate firm-years with negative net operating assets.  
For the accrual-based conservatism measure, firm-years without four lags of accruals 
are eliminated. To control for outliers in the AHL regressions, I delete observations 
ranking in the top and bottom 1% of the dependent and independent variables (annual 
return and operating income per share deflated by price).  Finally, firms undergoing a 
fiscal year-end change are excluded in the year of the change.   For the PZ and Mason 
measures, the same samples are used for the AHL regressions and return 
predictability tests (a separate sample for each measure because of differing data 
requirements) to allow for comparability –evidence of market inefficiency related to 
conservatism found in the return predictability tests then leads to an investigation of 
potential ERC bias due to conservatism.  I limit analysis of the accrual-based measure 
                                                 
11 AHL use a sample period from 1962 to 1995 and PZ use a sample period from 1975 to 1995. 




to the return predictability test.  The final samples include a maximum of 62,754 firm 
years for the tests using Q-score, 30,737 firm-years for the tests using Mason’s score, 
and 27,967 firm-years for the accrual-based measure. Table 1 presents descriptive 
statistics for variables used in the AHL regressions with the Q-score.  
 
3.5  Descriptive Statistics 
Table 2 contains descriptive statistics of firm characteristics for the entire 
sample and by level of Q (high, medium and low).  The characteristics for medium-Q 
firms compared to the other groups are graphically illustrated in Exhibit 1.  Relative 
to high-decile firms, firms in the lowest decile are larger (as measured by the market 
value of equity), are more profitable (as measured by earnings per share, return on 
assets and return on equity) and have a higher book to market ratio relative to high-
decile firms. Higher earnings (and thus higher return on assets and equity) for low-Q 
firms are consistent with the notion that conservatism and change in investment 
increase current earnings relative to the high-Q firms.  Medium-Q firms have higher 
means (and medians) for most firm characteristics relative to high- or low-Q firms.  
Interestingly, medium-Q firms have approximately three (six) times the mean 
(median) net operating assets as high- or low-Q firms but about the same amount of 
estimated reserves.  However, recall the Q-score depends on the changes in rather 
than the levels of estimated reserves and net operating assets.    Medium-firms have 
significantly higher average (median) market values than high- or low-Q firms. The 
differences cannot be attributed to industry differences since the ranking of Q within 




2-digit SIC code ensures that each industry has similar percentages of high, medium, 
and low Q firms.  
An analysis of changes in Q-ranks reveals that relatively few firms change 
from high to low ranks or vice versa in a given year (2.8%). I find that 1,061 firm-
years changed rank from high to low over the sample period compared to 628 that 
moved from low to high.  Further investigation into whether the move from high to 
low ranks of Q is due to changes in the numerator (estimated reserves) or 
denominator (net operating assets) finds an average one-year 7% (.5% median) 
decrease in estimated reserves and an average 216% (51% median) one-year increase 
in net operating assets.   The results suggest firms moving from high to low ranks of 
Q are growing as evidenced by the large average increase in net operating assets but 
are decreasing investment in R&D, inventory and advertising.  Whether this behavior 
indicates earnings management via real investment decisions is left for future 
research. 
 
4.  Results 
Table 3 reports the results from tests of the ability of Q-score to predict future 
returns.  Following PZ, in each scoring year from 1976 up through 2002 and within 2-
digit SIC code, I rank firms into ten equal-sized portfolios based on Q-scores. 
Portfolios are formed in year 0.   For each Q-score portfolio, raw and size-adjusted 
buy-and-hold returns are calculated for each year, -2 to +5.  The returns cumulation 
period in each year ends three-months after fiscal year-end.  Size-adjusted returns are 




calculated by subtracting the raw, buy and hold return on a size-matched, value-
weighted portfolio formed from CRSP size deciles.  Ranking within industry attempts 
to control for operating risk, and the size adjustment controls for the Fama and French 
(1992) “size effect” premium for risk.   Panel A reports the mean returns over the 
sample period and Panel B reports the mean size-adjusted returns.  
The results indicate returns are positively related to Q for years +1 to +5 and 
negatively related for years -2 to 0. Returns on low Q portfolios in year 0 are 
considerably higher than returns on high Q portfolios suggesting that investors 
misinterpret the earnings effects of the conservatism-growth interaction. The relation 
reverses in the following year, presumably as investors correct their error. The raw 
(size-adjusted) return in year +1 to a investment strategy that goes long in high Q-
stocks and short in low Q-stocks without considering transaction costs is 19.1% 
(9.7%), significant at p-value < .0001.  Future returns (years +2 to +5) to the strategy 
are similar in magnitude to those obtained by PZ but are not significant.12  The results 
are consistent with the notion that the market is inefficient with respect to earnings 
effects induced by a combination of conservatism and changes in investment.   
Next I assess whether conservatism-related inefficiencies materially affect the 
estimation of coefficients in a returns/earnings regression using the method in AHL.  I 
run year-by-year cross-sectional regressions of returns on operating income per share 
scaled by previous-year price for samples formed on high, low, and medium levels of 
PZ’s Q-score.  Groups are based on a ranking of firms on Q for each year and with-in 
                                                 
12 PZ tests of significance are based on 5,000 replications of randomly assigning firms to Q portfolios.  
PZ determine significance levels by observing the frequency of returns equal to the positive (negative) 
return on the investment strategy.   I use t-tests to test for significance. 




each two-digit SIC code, similar to the ranking procedure in PZ, as a means to control 
for risk.  The high (low) score group corresponds to the top (lowest) decile of firms in 
the ranking on Q.  Recall both high and low Q-scores imply low earnings quality.  
Firms in the medium-Q group are the middle 20% where the Q score equals 
approximately zero (i.e. has high earnings quality).  Following AHL, I then rerun the 
regressions for each sample after adjusting current returns for one-, two-, and three-
year ahead risk-adjusted returns.     
Panel A in Table 4 presents the results from the unadjusted and adjusted 
regressions.   The first set of regressions includes all observations in the sample to 
allow for comparison with results in AHL.   Although AHL’s independent variable is 
earnings, results for regressions with operating income as the independent variable 
provide similar conclusions.  Consistent with the notion that inefficiencies resolve 
over one to three years, estimated mean coefficients increase on average as the 
dependent variable includes future year’s returns.  The mean (median) coefficient 
increases from .744 (.786) for the unadjusted return to 1.095 (1.102) when adjusted 
for three-year ahead returns.   Panel B reports mean and median percentage changes;  
when three-year ahead returns are used for adjustments, the mean (median) increase 
in coefficients is 20.5% (40.2%), and the median is significant at p-value = .0014. 
AHL report mean and median increases of 77% and 66%, both significant at p-value 
< .001, when the adjustment includes three-year ahead returns.  The large difference 
in the magnitude of the adjustments between my study and theirs may be due to using 




operating income as the independent variable in this study or to sample selection 
since observations in my study are limited to those with Q-scores. 
I then apply the AHL adjustment to regressions for samples split on levels of 
conservatism and obtain mixed results.  In Panel B, mean percentage changes in 
coefficients for medium-Q firms decrease as the adjustment increases from one to 
three years, but the changes are not significantly different from zero.  Median 
coefficients for medium-Q firms increase on average by 33.2 % over three years, but 
the increase is only marginally significant at a p-value of .0986 in year three.  Taken 
together, the insignificant mean and median percentage changes are consistent with 
less inefficiency effects for firms with high quality earnings.   For low-Q firms, 
median percentage increases for years one and two are significant (19.8% and 37% 
with p-values of .0043 and .0055, respectively).  Three–year ahead adjustments are 
not significant.  For high-Q firms, the two and three-year adjustments result in 
significant increases relative to the unadjusted amounts and higher adjustments 
relative to low- and medium-Q firms, as expected; the median percentage increase in 
ERC achieved when the adjustment includes two- and three-year ahead returns is 
56.2% and 65.6%, respectively, both significant at p < .0001.  Mean results for the 
high-Q group are somewhat consistent with PZ’s story:  unadjusted current returns 
are lower than those of the low-Q portfolio, but reverse in the future as the market 
resolves the inefficiencies.     
Panel C of Table 4 presents statistical tests of differences in percentage 
changes across groups.  A significant difference between high- and low-Q groups 




occurs for the one-year adjusted coefficients, but opposite of predictions:  the 
percentage change for low-Q groups is a 0.418 (p-value of .0208) larger than the 
percentage change for high-Q groups. The direction of the difference reverses in 
future years, but is not significant.  I find the results somewhat puzzling -- if the 
adjusted coefficients followed the pattern of return reversals observed in Table 3, I 
would expect high-Q percentage changes to be larger than low-Q percentage changes 
for the one-year adjustment.  I find significantly higher two- and three-year high-Q 
median percentages changes compared to medium-Q median percentage changes, 
consistent with predictions.  However, I find significantly lower one- and two-year 
median percentage changes for medium-Q firms relative to low-Q firms, opposite of 
predictions and inconsistent with the pattern of returns in PZ.  Increasing the power of 
the tests might lead to finding more significant differences between groups.  
Currently, test statistics are calculated using 27 annual observations; unfortunately 
data availability restricts adding more years to the sample.13  
Next I repeat the above tests with Mason’s conservatism score.  Table 5 
contains results from a trading strategy using the change in Mason’s score (for size-
adjusted returns only).  It shows excess returns for years +1 to +3 of  10.7% (p-value 
< .0001), 11.4% (p-value < .001) and 10.6% (p-value < .10), suggesting the market 
takes three years to work out the inefficiencies compared to the one-year observed in 
a trading strategy using Q.  The adjusted coefficients in Table 6, panel A do not 
follow the same general pattern as observed in Table 4:  the three-year adjusted 
                                                 
13 I also rerun the tests with operating income changes as an additional independent variable and 
observe similar results (unreported).   
 




coefficients for the high-score group are higher than the low-score group and the 
adjusted coefficients for the low score group are higher than the medium score group, 
which is inconsistent with predictions.  However, panel B reveals fewer significant 
percentage changes than the previous regressions using Q-scores.  One possible 
explanation for the weaker results is that the inclusion of conservatism arising from 
management’s estimates in the score adds noise to the measure.  Another potential 
explanation is the procedure of handling missing score components (replacing of a 
large number of the Mason score components with industry averages) and then 
ranking the score within SIC codes to control for risk may lead to little variation 
between high and low scores.14  
  My final analysis uses a return predictability test to investigate inefficiencies 
related to conditional conservatism, the conservatism that arises from the tendency to 
include bad news earlier in earnings than good news.   I measure conditional 
conservatism using a five-year average of accruals scaled by total assets since the 
asymmetric timeliness in earnings should lead to an accumulation of negative 
accruals.   Table 7 reports average returns for portfolios formed on the accrual 
measure. The trading strategy produces positive future returns only in year +1 (7%, 
significant at p-value < .05)  and year +5 (significant at p-value < .10).   Sloan (1996) 
performs a similar test using current year accruals in an examination of the market’s 
ability to distinguish correctly the accrual and cash flow components of earnings.  
                                                 
14 To investigate the possibility that the procedure to replace missing score components with industry 
averages biases my results for the Q-score sample, I select a sample (n=13,239) that requires 
components of the Q-score to be nonmissing. Results (untabulated) show two-year percentage changes 
for high-Q firms are significantly greater than zero.  They are also higher relative to all percentage 
changes for low- and medium-Q firms, but the differences are not statistically significant. 




Sloan finds excess returns of 10%, 5% and 3% for years +1 to +3 (insignificant for 
year +3) and interprets his results to indicate the market never realizes the error 
because accruals reverse before three years.  The premise behind the measure in my 
paper is that with conditional conservatism, negative accruals will accumulate.  So the 
five-year average of accruals should capture an information set different from Sloan’s 
measure, but it is possible the results in my tests are reflecting the same anomaly 
detected by Sloan. 
In tests of return predictability, we need to know if the predictive ability of 
conservatism to predict returns is subsumed by other variables which have been 
shown to predict future stock returns.  PZ’s findings of predictable future returns due 
to the interaction of conservatism and a change in investment may be due to a 
correlation between Q and other anomaly factors.  Table 8 provides correlations of Q 
with factors previously identified in anomalies studies:  size, book-to-market, 
leverage, earnings-to-price, the risk proxies suggested by Fama and French (1992), 
and accruals identified by Sloan (1996).  Because PZ’s research design matches on 
size and industry, some of the differences in risk proxies across Q-groups are 
mitigated as evidenced by the weak correlations between Q, BTM, and leverage.  Q is 
slightly correlated with size as measured by the firm’s market capitalization decile-
rank provided by CRSP (Pearson correlation = -.02; p-value < .0001) and earnings-to-
price (Pearson correlation = -.07; p-value < .0001). However, Q is most strongly 
correlated with accruals (Pearson correlation -.1911; p < .0001).15   PZ suggest the 
                                                 
15 Accruals are calculated as the difference between net income before depreciation and cash flows 
from operations scaled by total assets. 




correlation between Q and accruals arises because of management’s propensity to 
manage earnings.  If accruals are used to manage earnings, then management may 
also use real investment decisions to manage earnings, which Q captures since Q is 
designed to reflect changes in investment in off-balance sheet assets relative to net 
operating assets.  PZ consider the correlation of Q and accruals as a possible 
explanation for Q’s ability to predict future returns.  In sensitivity tests, they regress 
future returns on the above risk factors, accruals, and Q.  They conclude Q’s effect on 
future returns is incremental to that of the other risk proxies and accruals (the mean 
coefficient on Q is significantly positive).  Mason (2004) suggests a correlation 
between her measure (similar to Q) and accruals is possible due to current-period 
operating accruals being included in net operating assets.  However, I find 
insignificant correlations between accruals and net operating assets (untabulated).    
Although most of the differences in portfolio returns are observed in year +1, 
significant excess size-adjusted returns for years +2 and +5 in PZ’s paper (year +3 in 
my paper) provides possible evidence that Q is correlated with a yet-to-be identified 
risk factor. 
 
5.  Conclusion 
 The objective of this study is to test for bias in coefficients from returns-
earnings regressions resulting from market inefficiency due to conservatism.  Penman 
and Zhang (2002) demonstrate that the market is inefficient with respect to the 
earnings effects produced by the interaction of conservatism and change in 




investment and develop Q to measure conservatism’s earnings effects.   Since PZ 
provide evidence that a trading strategy based on Q earns excess returns in future 
years, I investigate whether the inefficiencies have implications for ERCs.  In 
addition, I examine two other measures of conservatism.  
  To assess potential coefficient bias, I use a method developed by Aboody et 
al. (2002) that adjusts current period returns for information related to current 
earnings found in future returns.  Adjusting coefficients for the market’s delayed 
reactions to accounting information should then produce coefficients free of bias.  I 
expect higher adjustments for firms displaying high levels of conservatism relative to 
firms with medium and low conservatism, and higher adjustments for firms with 
medium levels of conservatism relative to those with low levels.    Overall, the results 
are mixed.  I observe differences between adjusted and unadjusted coefficients for 
companies with high conservatism that are significantly greater than the differences 
for companies with medium levels of conservatism as expected, when the adjustment 
uses two-and three-year ahead future returns.  Although I expect a larger adjustment 
for the high conservatism group relative to the low conservatism group, the one-year 
adjustment yields significantly larger coefficient increase for low-Q firms compared 
to the high-Q firms; the other differences in adjustments are mostly insignificant.   
The low significance levels may be due to low power of the tests which use only 27 
annual differences in coefficients.  Unfortunately, adding years to the sample is not 
possible due to lack of data. 




 Because I do find some significant differences between ERC adjustments 
between companies exhibiting high and medium-levels of conservatism, the results 
lend some support to the notion that coefficient bias due to conservatism can affect 
inferences, particularly if the magnitude of the ERC is the focus of the investigation. 
Thus, conclusions from my study may be of interest to future researchers who wish to 
avoid drawing spurious inferences from their statistical tests.  However, the 
inefficiency documented in PZ does not appear to be a simple story of 
under/overreaction to earnings because I find the AHL regressions do not lead to 
consistent significant changes in ERCs across the conservatism samples.  Unraveling 
the more complicated story is left to future research. 
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   Figure 1.  Overview of the Five Analyses 
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Regression Descriptive Statistics 
 
 
Variable n Mean Median STD Q1 Q3 
OIit  61,124 1.703 0.978 2.967 0.038 2.548
Pit   60,084 15.158 9.875 18.289 4.125 20.250
OIit /Pit-1  60,038 0.087 0.091 0.203 0.009 0.178
Rit  60,482 0.131 0.031 0.580 -0.250 0.376
Rit+1  60,218 0.174 0.039 0.830 -0.243 0.389
Rit+2  60,220 0.350 0.108 1.823 -0.300 0.625
Rit+3  60,222 0.516 0.161 2.398 -0.333 0.816
ARit+1      60,213 0.150 -0.042 0.978 -0.404 0.423
ARit+2   57,396 0.164 -0.114 1.986 -0.506 0.410
ARit+3 54,749 0.148 .0.171 1.843 -0.578 0.392
 Q 61,176 -0.000 -0.000 0.246 -0.012 0.012
   
________________________________________________________________________ 
OIt  is operating income per share;  Pit is stock price three months after the fiscal year end 
t.  Rit  is firm i’s current period return ending three months after fiscal year t; Rit+τ  (τ = 1, 
2, 3) are firm i’s returns for 12, 24, 36 months beginning three months after the fiscal 
year end t.  ARit+τ (τ = 1, 2, 3) are firm i’s size-adjusted returns for 12, 24, 36 months 
beginning three months after the fiscal year end t.  Q is Penman Zhang’s (2002) measure 
of earnings quality which captures the interactive effect of accounting conservatism and 
change in investment.   
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TABLE 2  
Firm Characteristics by Level of Q-Score 
 
Panel A: All Observations 
 N Mean Std Dev Q1 Median Q3 
Market Value of Equity* 60,990 815.35 7231.19 14.53 52.84 226.34
Book-to-Market 60,988 1.55 135.65 0.34 0.62 1.05
Earnings per Share 61,142 0.65 2.18 -0.10 0.47 1.34
Return on Equity** 48,126 -0.01 0.32 -0.01 0.06 0.11
Return on Assets 47,483 0.02 .173 0.01 0.06 0.10
Debt to Total Assets 61,176 0.17 0.18 0.02 0.13 0.27
Estimated Reserves* 61,176 32.41 214.16 0.59 2.49 8.96
Net Operating Assets* 61,176 421.21 2947.56 10.74 39.05 149.63
 
 
Panel B: Lowest Q- Decile 
 N Mean Std Dev Q1 Median Q3 
Market Value of Equity* 4,932 502.38 7457.45 9.65 32.59 121.79 
Book-to-Market 4,932 0.72 3.20 0.23 0.47 0.87 
Earnings per Share 4,952 0.52 1.93 -0.14 0.23 1.01 
Return on Equity** 3,270 -0.02 0.38 -0.03 0.06 0.12 
Return on Assets 3,240 0.01 0.23 -.01 0.06 0.11 
Debt to Assets 4,956 0.14 0.18 0.00 0.07 0.22 
Estimated Reserves* 4,956 20.94 118.27 0.76 2.55 7.90 
Net Operating Assets* 4,956 146.63 761.40 4.45 12.77 45.46 
 
Panel C:  Highest Q-Decile 
 n Mean Std Dev Q1 Median Q3 
Market Value of Equity* 4,854 400.91 4353.00 7.49 25.03 89.83 
Book-to-Market 4,854 0.67 1.36 0.22 0.53 1.01 
Earnings per Share 4,877 -0.05 2.73 -0.77 -0.07 0.75 
Return on Equity** 3,458 -0.21 0.57 -0.32 -0.01 0.09 
Return on Assets 3,480 -0.12 0.32 -0.23 0.00 0.08 
Debt to Assets 4,880 0.13 0.21 0.00 0.05 0.19 
Estimated Reserves* 4,880 28.50 179.09 1.09 3.46 10.58 
Net Operating Assets* 4,880 148.98 1047.76 2.77 9.44 36.04 
 
*in millions 
** Firm-years with negative equity are deleted 











Panel D: Medium Q-Deciles 5 and 6 (where Q- score equals approximately zero) 
 
 n Mean Std Dev Q1 Median Q3 
Market Value of Equity* 12,957 921.78 6948.00 20.55 78.12 353.95 
Book-to-Market 12,956 0.87 1.27 0.41 0.68 1.11 
Earnings per Share 12,992 0.91 1.98 0.08 0.71 1.55 
Return on Equity** 10,763 0.04 0.18 0.02 0.07 0.11 
Return on Assets 10,677 0.05 0.09 0.03 0.06 0.10 
Debt to Assets 12,999 0.21 0.18 0.05 0.18 0.30 
Estimated Reserves* 12,999 30.80 218.45 0.33 1.62 6.65 
Net Operating Assets* 12,999 590.96 3439.61 23.77 77.00 270.62 
*in millions 
 ** Firm-years with negative equity are deleted 
 
 
Market value of equity equals total number of common shares outstanding as of year-end 
multiplied by end-of-year stock price.  The book-to-market ratio is shareholder’s equity divided 
by the market value of equity.  Earnings per share is basic earnings per share:  Net income 
(including extraordinary items) divided by the weighted-average number of common shares 
outstanding (Compustat data item 53).  Return on assets equals net income before interest 
expense divided by average total assets.  Return on equity equals net income less dividends 
divided by average shareholder’s equity.  Firm-years with negative equity are deleted before 
calculating descriptive statistics for return on equity.   Dividing total debt by total assets equals 
the debt to asset ratio.  Estimated reserves comprise the numerator in the Penman and Zhang (PZ) 
(2002) Q-score and equal the sum of estimated unrecorded assets arising from conservative 
accounting for R&D, advertising and inventory; net operating assets in the Q-score denominator 
are defined as assets minus liabilities, excluding financial assets and liabilities.  In footnote 8, p. 
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EXHIBIT 1 
Descriptive Statistics by Level of Q-Score* 
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TABLE 3 




Year Relative to Year Q-Score is Calculated (Year 0) 
 
Q Portfolios         -2          -1           0        1             2           3            4             5               
 
Panel A: Raw Returns 
Lowest Q .222 .328 .179 .123 .216 .216 .165 .152 
2  .247 .259 .198 .175 .221 .212 .171 .245 
3  .232 .253 .169 .213 .178 .206 .232 .182 
4  .203 .253 .136 .216 .200 .214 .159 .135 
5  .240 .192 .120 .192 .193 .193 .164 .164 
6  .189 .170 .134 .202 .231 .179 .178 .220 
7  .183 .123 .091 .226 .222 .249 .203 .187 
8  .206 .144 .116 .227 .248 .173 .222 .194 
9  .195 .107 .109 .256 .257 .204 .203 .197 
Highest Q .177 .085 .067 .314 .187 .232 .180 .173 
  
High-Low            -.044    -.243       -.112 .191 -.029 .015  .015 .021  
p-value  .2673      <.0001    .0003       <.0001 .4959 .7556 .7539 .6000 
 
Firm-years 59,224  62,437    62,754     62,432    57,058    50,101    43,934    38,508 
______________________________________________________________________ 








Year Relative to Year Q-Score is Calculated (Year 0) 
 
Q Portfolios         -2          -1           0        1             2           3            4             5               
 
Panel B:  Size-Adjusted Returns 
Lowest Q .086 .175 .016      -.003 .067 .046 .061 .060 
2  .106 .163 .024 .014 .061 .047 .070 .042 
3  .078 .100 .022 .018 .031 .060 .062 .052 
4  .062 .073      -.004 .013 .055 .069 .037 .050 
5  .056 .037      -.007 .022 .045 .035 .056 .043 
6  .035      -.009      -.017 .036 .055 .036 .044 .065 
7  .030      -.019      -.032 .065 .063 .049 .066 .048 
8  .044      -.024      -.029 .063 .103 .063 .048 .054 
9  .032      -.034      -.032 .070 .100 .071 .075 .084 
Highest Q           -.001      -.029      -.050 .094 .085 .105 .034 .084 
  
High-Low            -.088    -.204 -.066      .097 .019 .058 -.027 .024 
p-value  <.0001  <.0001      <.0001  <.0001 .4401 .0411 .2518 .3953 
 
Firm-years 56,850    59,772    60,062     59,748     54,666      47,989     42,102   36,930 
 
Buy-and-hold returns for each Q-score portfolio are calculated for each year, -2 to +5, in each 
scoring year 1976 through 2002.  Panel A reports the mean returns over the sample period.  Panel 
B reports the mean size-adjusted returns, computed by subtracting the raw (buy and hold) return 
on a size-matched, value-weighted portfolio formed from CRSP size-deciles.  
_____________________________       ____              




Return Regressions on Operating Income 
(Q-Score) 
 
Stock return is cross-sectionally regressed on operating income per share deflated by stock price of the 
previous year.  Summary statistics on the annual cross-sectional regression coefficients are reported in 
Panel A.  To control for market inefficiencies, firm i’s 12-month stock return beginning 3 months after 



















to form itR̂ , where τ+itR (τ =1,2, 3) is firm i’s stock 
return for 12, 24, 36 months beginning three months after the fiscal year end t, and υ τ+itR  is the 
corresponding size-decile return.  The Q-score groups are based on a ranking of firms each year on Q-
score, within two-digit industry codes.  The high Q-score group is the top 10% of firms in the ranking on Q, 
the medium Q-score groups are the middle 20% (where Q equals approximately 0) and the low Q-score 
group is the bottom 10% of firms in the ranking on Q-score.  For Panel B, the percentage change in 
coefficients is defined as the coefficient from the adjusted regression minus the corresponding coefficient 
from the unadjusted regression deflated by the unadjusted coefficient.  Statistical tests are based on 27 
annual observations of change in coefficients from 1976 to 2002 for the one-year adjustment horizon.  
Statistical tests for the two (three)-year adjustments are based on 26 (25) annual regressions from 1976 to 
2001 (2000).  Panel C reports tests of significance for differences in percentage change percentages across 
Q-score groups.  Reported p-values for mean (median) tests are based on t-statistics (signed-rank statistics). 
 
Panel A:  Return regression coefficients estimates   
 All coefficients are significant at p < .0001  
Level    
Q-      Adjustment  
Score         Horizon           Unadjusted    One-year τ=1     Two-year τ=2    Three -year τ=3 
  
All Mean 0.744 0.911 1.045 1.095 
Obs Median 0.786 1.027 1.066 1.102 
      
Lowest Mean 0.690 0.941 1.073 1.129 
 Median 0.690 0.955 1.098 0.983 
      
Q ≈ 0 Mean 0.843 1.001 1.017 1.107 
 Median 0.882 1.163 1.077 1.019 
      
Highest Mean 0.657 0.763 1.367 1.519 
 Median 0.747 0.771 1.034 1.132 
      
Firm-years  59,396 59,148 56,337 53,699 
     
      
 
______________________________________________________________________________________ 












TABLE 4, continued 
 
 
Panel B:  Summary statistics for the percentage change on the coefficient of  
  Operating Income Per Share 
  
 Adjustment Horizon                One-year τ=1          Two-year τ=2     Three-year τ=3 
All Q    
  Mean               0.167 0.209 0.205 
  Median              0.252 0.394 0.402 
  p-value for mean test            .0219 .3409 .4736 
  p- value for median test             .0020 .0012 .0014 
    
Lowest Q    
  Mean               1.785 0.952 0.245 
  Median               0.198 0.370 0.505 
  p- value for mean test           .1952 .0300 .6296 
  p- value for median test                 .0043 .0055 .4244 
    
Q ≈ 0    
 Mean               -0.058 -0.443 -0.578 
 Median 0.274 0.261 0.332 
 p- value for mean test           .7751 .4806 .5249 
 p- value for median test                 .1087 .1403 .0986 
    
Highest Q    
  Mean              0.124 1.491 1.361 
  Median                0.117 0.562 0.656 
  p- value for mean test             .4749 .0985 .0069 
  p- value for median test .5423 <.0001 <.0001 
 





TABLE 4, continued 
 
 
Panel C:  Summary statistics for tests of differences in percentage changes across Q-groups 
       
 Adjustment Horizon 
Difference in Percentage Changes   One-year τ=1   Two-year τ=2 Three-year τ=3 
    
High Q -  Low Q    
  Mean              -1.661 0.540 1.117 
  Median                -0.418 0.197 0.362 
 p-value for mean test             .2564 .4011 .1755 
 p-value for median test .0208 .1965 .1793 
    
High Q -  Medium  Q    
  Mean              0.182 1.934 1.940 
  Median                -0.116 0.578 0.668 
 p-value for mean test             .3132 .0512 .0248 
 p-value for median test .9442 .0059 .0025 
    
Medium  Q -  Low Q    
  Mean              -1.843 -1.395 -0.823 
  Median                -0.252 -0.370 -0.122 
 p-value for mean test             .2197 .0346 .4097 
 p-value for median test .0527 .0078 .3362 







 TABLE 5 
Mean Percentage Annual Stock Returns for Portfolios Formed  





Year Relative to Year Score  is Calculated (Year 0) 
 
Score Portfolios     -2          -1           0        1             2           3            4             5               
 
 Size-Adjusted Returns 
Lowest   .130 .190 .073 .005 .027 .007 .033 .001 
2  .133 .191 .048 .035 .064 .041 .046 .043 
3  .113 .157 .034 .029 .050 .048 .050 .031 
4  .102 .095 .022 .041 .040 .062 .033 .008  
5  .074 .077 .018 .047 .044 .036 .033 .030  
6  .050 .035 .026 .082 .054 .035 .033 .027 
7  .062      -.020      -.004 .083 .087 .054 .056 .035  
8  .022      -.041      -.008 .069 .124 .084 .033 .024 
9              -.015      -.060      -.015 .096 .093 .065 .078 .060  
Highest              -.022      -.079 .018 .112 .141 .113 .043 .047 
 
High-Low           -.153     -.269       -.091 .107 .114       .106       .010 .046  
p-value  <.0001     <.0001   <.0001     <.0001 .0005 .0136 .7916 .1566 
 
Firm-years 29,028  30,541    30,737      30,593    28,087    25,072     22,522      20,379 
  
Buy-and-hold returns for each accrual-measure portfolio are calculated for each year, -2 to +5, in 
each scoring year 1976 through 2002.  Panel A reports the mean returns over the sample period.  
Panel B reports the mean size-adjusted returns, computed by subtracting the raw (buy and hold) 
return on a size-matched, value-weighted portfolio formed from CRSP size-deciles.  
_____________________________       ____              
 




Return Regressions on Operating Income 
(Mason’s Score - Modified) 
 
Stock return is cross-sectionally regressed on operating income per share deflated by stock price of the 
previous year.  Summary statistics on the cross-sectional regression coefficients are reported in Panel A.  
To control for market inefficiencies, firm i’s 12-month stock return beginning 3 months after fiscal year-



















to form itR̂ , where Rit+τ (τ =1,2, 3) is firm i’s stock return for 12, 24, 
36 months beginning three months after the fiscal year end t, and υ τ+itR  is the corresponding size-decile 
return. The groups are based on a ranking of firms each year on Mason’s (2004) differenced conservatism 
score, within two-digit industry codes.  The high -score group is the top 10% of firms in the ranking on the 
score, the medium score groups are the middle 20% (where the score equals approximately 0) and the low-
score group is the bottom 10% of firms in the ranking.  For Panel B, the change in coefficients is defined as 
the coefficient from the adjusted regression minus the corresponding coefficient from the unadjusted 
regression deflated by the unadjusted coefficient. Statistical tests are based on 27 annual observations of 
change in coefficients from 1976 to 2002 for the one-year adjustment horizon.  Statistical tests for the two 
(three)-year adjustments are based on 26 (25) annual regressions from 1976 to 2001 (2000). 
 
Panel A:  Return regression coefficients estimates   
 All coefficients are significant at p-value < .0001 except as noted 
Level    
Mason’s   
Modified      Adjustment 
Score        Horizon        Unadjusted    One-year τ=1     Two-year τ=2    Three -year τ=3 
  
All Mean 0.666 0821 0.927 1.058 
Obs Median 0.701 .958 1.071 1.144 
      
Lowest Mean 0.765 0.999 1.324 1.194 
 Median 0.775 0.828 1.168 1.089 
      
Q ≈ 0 Mean 0.752 1.013 1.151 0.867 
 Median 0.780 0.904 0.932     0.930** 
      
Highest Mean 0.646 0.678  1.613* 1.490* 
 Median 0.623 0.628 0.788 0.981 
      
Firm-years  29,787 29,676 28,795 28,058 
     
*     significant at p-value = .01 
**   significant at p-value = .001 
  
______________________________________________________________________________________ 
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TABLE 6, continued 
 
Panel B:  Summary statistics for the percentage change on the coefficient of  
  Operating Income Per Share 
  
 Adjustment Horizon                One-year τ=1          Two-year τ=2     Three -year τ=3 
All Obs    
  Mean               0.629 0.711 1.014 
  Median              -0.028 -0.451 -0.419 
  p-value for mean test            .4581 .5860 .5487 
  p-value for median test             .0015 .0025 .0146 
    
    
Lowest     
  Mean               -0.413 -2.263 -0.052 
  Median               -0.094 -0.287 -0.089 
  p-value for mean test           .4851 .2552 .9198 
  p-value for median test                 .7011 .5572 1.000 
    
    
Score ≈ 0    
  Mean               -0.210 -0.507 0.154 
  Median -0.428 -0.375 -0.375 
  p-value for mean test           .3402 .2100 .7778 
  p-value for median test                 .0192 .0094 .2295 
    
    
Highest    
  Mean              -0.294 -2.328 -1.421 
  Median  -0.182 -0.319 -0.481 
  p-value for mean test             .2822 .1267 .0111 
 p-value for median test .2478 .1686 .0433 
 
 









Mean Percentage Annual Stock Returns for Portfolios Formed  





Year Relative to Year Accrual Measure is Calculated (Year 0) 
 




Lowest   .161 .152 .092 .028 .085 .095 .116 .094 
2  .057 .057 .047 .053 .070 .067 .073 .083 
3  .026 .057 .048 .035 .068 .109 .061 .086  
4  .039 .045 .044 .045 .076 .054 .060 .073 
5  .021 .034 .038 .061 .069 .055 .071 .067 
6  .017 .054 .076 .052 .069 .064 .063 .077 
7  .030 .057 .064 .073 .106 .092 .074 .088 
8  .027 .068 .101 .081 .077 .084 .097 .111 
9  .058 .041 .089 .091 .112 .112 .091 .100 
Highest  .041 .057 .040 .097 .105 .076 .112 .168 
  
High-Low            -.120    -.095        -.053 .070  .020      -.018     -.004 .075 
p-value  .0015     .0143        .1132     .0254 .5395 .5826 .9371 .0843 
 
Firm-Years 27,964   27,965    27,967    27,804        25,316    20,991    17,192   13,823 
 
Buy-and-hold returns for each accrual-measure portfolio are calculated for each year, -2 to +5, in 
each scoring year 1975 through 2002.  Table reports the mean size-adjusted returns, computed by 
subtracting the raw (buy and hold) return on a size-matched, value-weighted portfolio formed 
from CRSP size-deciles.  
_____________________________       ____              
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      Size       Book-to-        Leverage         E/P             Accruals            
                                        Market 
________________________________________________________________________ 
 
Q          -0.0116          -.0002           -.0006         -.0730            -.1911 
(p-value)   (.004)           (.9593)         (.8683)       (< .0001)       (< .0001)  
    
__________________________________________________________________ 
 
Size is a firm’s end-of-year decile-rank of market capitalization provided by CRSP, leverage is the debt to 
equity ratio, and E/P is earnings per share divided by price.  Accruals equal net income before depreciation 
less cash flows from operations scaled by total assets. 
________________________________________________________________________ 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
